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Abstract. Kernel audit logs are an invaluable source of information in
the forensic investigation of a cyber-attack. However, the coarse granu-
larity of dependency information in audit logs leads to the construction
of huge attack graphs which contain false or inaccurate dependencies.
To overcome this problem, we propose a system, called ProPatrol,
which leverages the open compartmentalized design in families of enter-
prise applications used in security-sensitive contexts (e.g., browser, chat
client, email client). To achieve its goal, ProPatrol infers a model for
an application’s high-level tasks as input-processing compartments us-
ing purely the audit log events generated by that application. The main
benefit of this approach is that it does not rely on source code or binary
instrumentation, but only on a preliminary and general knowledge of
an application’s architecture to bootstrap the analysis. Our experiments
with enterprise-level attacks demonstrate that ProPatrol significantly
cuts down the forensic investigation effort and quickly pinpoints the root-
cause of attacks. ProPatrol incurs less than 2% runtime overhead on
a commodity operating system.
1 Introduction
Targeted and stealthy cyberattacks (referred to as Advanced Persistent Threats
(APTs)) follow a multi-stage threat workflow [5] to break into an enterprise
network with the goal of harvesting invaluable information. APTs often utilize
spear phishing and drive-by download to gain a foothold in an enterprise (initial
compromise). After this step, APTs propagate to enterprise targets (e.g., Intranet
servers) in pursuit of high-value assets such as confidential information.
Once APTs are detected, it is crucial to track the causal linkage between
events in a timely manner to find out the attack provenance. Consequently,
attack provenance may be used to detect affected entities within a host or across
multiple hosts. As soon as an attack provenance is uncovered, a system analyst
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can take immediate damage control measures, use it to make sense of past attacks
or to prevent future attacks.
The state-of-the-art technique for provenance tracking is to use kernel audit
logs to record information flow between system entities [7, 15] and then corre-
late these entities for forensic analysis. In particular, after an attack is detected,
system analysts use the detection point as a seed to initiate backward track-
ing strategies to determine the root-cause of that attack, and forward tracking
methods to find out the impacts of the attack.
Kernel auditing techniques interpose at the system call layer; therefore, they
have acceptable runtime overheads but suffer from the dependency explosion
problem. In particular, due to coarse nature of dependencies that manifest in
audit logs, an entity may falsely appear to be causally dependent on many other
entities. For instance, consider a browser process that has multiple tabs open,
each receiving data from different socket connections. If the browser process
writes to a file, then during forensic analysis, that file will look causally de-
pendent on all the socket connections the browser has accessed up to the write
operation. In case of a drive-by-download attack that exploits that browser, it
becomes challenging for system analysts to pinpoint the origin of the attack
among all the accessed sockets.
To mitigate the dependency explosion problem, researchers have proposed
compartmentalization techniques to partition the execution of a long-running
process to smaller units [18,20,21]. BEEP [18] and ProTracer [21] compartmen-
talize processes to low-level units based on iterations of event handling loops.
MPI [20] compartmentalizes processes to high-level tasks based on source code
annotations manually performed by developers. Unfortunately, these techniques
rely on source code or binary instrumentation.
Our Work. In this paper, we present an approach (called ProPatrol),
aimed at high-level activity compartmentalization to address the dependence
explosion problem and to provide units of execution boundaries to aid foren-
sic attack investigation. One of the main benefits of our approach is that does
not require application source/binary instrumentation. The key insight in our
approach is to leverage the execution compartments that are inherent to the
design of certain Internet-facing applications (e.g., browsers, chat clients, email
clients) in order to mitigate the dependence explosion problem during forensic
analysis and are able to pinpoint true dependencies. Through a combination of
execution compartments and provenance, we demonstrate how a cyber-analyst
can perform precise forensic attack investigation. Starting with the choice of
compartmentalized applications, our approach also includes an inference mecha-
nism to identify the execution compartments implemented in these applications
directly from their audit log traces.
Our approach does require enterprise users to be restricted to the use of
compartmentalized Internet-facing applications. While this may seem stringent,
recent trends [13] towards locked-down enterprise software (e.g., Windows 10 S)
suggest that enterprises and software vendors desire this direction. In addition,
modern applications are moving to a sandboxing-based architecture both for
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security and performance purposes. Google Chrome, for instance, is a relevant
example of such an application, while Firefox is moving in the same direction [1].
Results Overview. Using APT scenarios as case studies, we evaluated the
effectiveness and efficiency of ProPatrol on five attack scenarios in an en-
terprise setting. ProPatrol successfully constructed forensic graphs on five
distinct lateral movement attempts that target high-value assets in Intranet
servers. We note that these attacks cover a broad surface of the APT landscape.
More precisely, our evaluation covers the major APT attack vectors such as
spear phishing, drive-by downloads, and classic web-based attack vectors such
as CSRF and DNS rebinding. In all the attacks, lateral movement is attempted
by initiating a connection to an Intranet server. In addition to covering a wide
space of APT vectors, our evaluation also spans web browsers, email clients,
and instant messaging clients —which are the common classes of applications
targeted by APTs. Measured on the five attack scenarios for its runtime, on
average, ProPatrol operates with an overhead of less than 2%. Most impor-
tantly, ProPatrol is able to detect the execution compartments responsible for
the attacks correctly in all the cases, thus efficiently addressing the dependency
explosion problem.
Outline. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2
we motivate the problem by showing the importance of execution partitioning
for better forensic analysis and describe details of Provenance Monitoring tech-
niques that are required for log collection. Section 3 discusses the details of our
compartmentalization approach. In Section 4, we highlight implementation de-
tails. Evaluation of our approach appears in Section 5. Section 6 discusses related
work. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Background
2.1 Motivating Example
An enterprise network is typically composed of several employee machines and
Intranet servers that host high confidentiality and high integrity assets. The net-
work is often protected by a defensive perimeter consisting of firewalls and IDSs.
In a typical setting, the employee machines may interact with external machines
on the Internet, while the Intranet servers may receive connections only from
inside the enterprise network. APTs typically exploit such connectivity of the
employee machines to gain an initial foothold in the enterprise and subsequently
perform lateral movement to reach high-value assets.
The most widely used APT attack vectors include sophisticated social en-
gineering (e.g., spear phishing), browser compromises (e.g., via drive-by down-
loads), and web attacks (e.g., session riding) [12] that impersonate legitimate
users of an enterprise host and connect to Intranet servers. Consider the follow-
ing APT attack vector that highlights the need for precise provenance tracking.
Alice, an employee of an enterprise, has several tabs open on her browser. In
one of the tabs, she is lured to a malicious website that contains a 0-day Java
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exploit that targets an unpatched Java plugin inside her browser. The exploit
instantaneously drops an executable file, which is executed and spawns a shell
where the attacker can remotely enter commands. Using this shell, the attacker
reads Alice’s recent activities from her command history and notices a series of
git commands to an internal GIT server. Next, the attacker executes a git pull
command to retrieve the most recent documents and proceeds to slowly exfiltrate
them to a C&C server that he controls. Alice is unaware of any of these actions.
This example showcases a drive-by-download APT attack vector [22], a com-
mon method used to gain an initial foothold in an enterprise. The next step is
typically gaining control of the compromised local machine followed by further
connections to other internal machines. When a step of this attack is detected, it
is crucial to causally link it with the events of the initial infection and ultimately
with the provenance of the input that causes the initial infection. For doing so,
we need to deal with several challenges pertinent to provenance tracking, de-
pendence explosion, abstraction of input/output, dynamics of applications, and
performance issues for timely analysis. In particular, dependency explosion is
one of the major hurdles to a fast and effective forensic investigation. This prob-
lem arises when a process receives several inputs from different sources within
a short amount of time, while at the same time producing several outputs. In
this context, the primary challenge is to associate the provenance of each input
to the correct outputs. For instance, the average number of records generated
by the audit logs is typically between 5,000 - 500,000 records per minute, only a
minuscule portion of which is related to the attack [9].
2.2 Provenance Monitoring
In this section, we describe details of a provenance monitoring system which pro-
duces logs required for building a dependency graph that is used for post-attack
forensics analysis. As the dependency graph is built based on information flow
among system entities, we do not need to log all the system calls. Table 1 shows
a summary of the most important system calls that are required for informa-
tion flow tracking and provenance identification. In the table, we show different
categories of system calls according to their purpose. Some system calls are re-
sponsible for the actual information flow between objects. For instance, when
a new process is created via a clone system call, it inherits the file descriptors
of its parent. Therefore, there is information flow from the parent to the child
process.
A subset of the system calls (third row of Table 1) is responsible for initial-
izing and setting up data structures rather than dealing with information flow
directly. For example, the socketpair system call creates two sockets. Prepara-
tory system calls initialize data structures, and in certain cases provide the
provenance of the subsequent data. For example, by checking the lseek system
call and considering file offsets, we only track specific offsets of a file to prevent
unnecessary dependencies. Termination system calls deal with the destruction
of objects.
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Purpose Relevant System Calls
Information Flow clone (process), fork , msgsnd, msgrcv, write, send, read, recv, exec
Creation open, creat, dup, link, socket, socketpair
Preparatory lseek, connect, listen, accept, bind, clone (thread), link, sendto
Termination close, exit, exit_group, unlink, kill
Table 1. System event types.
From To Relevant System Calls Source Destination
Process Process clone (process), fork, vfork, rfork,
msgsnd
event caller arg(s)
Process Process wait, msgrcv arg(s) event caller
Process File/Socket write, pwrite, writev, pwritev, send,
sendto, sendmsg
event caller arg(s)
File/Socket Process read, recv, recvfrom, recvmsg, execl,
execv, execle, execve, execlp, execvp
arg(s) event caller
Table 2. Information flow events.
Flow Types. Table 2 shows the details of information flow sources, destina-
tions, and events. We summarize these details in the table by using only three
types of objects (File, socket, process). As shown in the table, there are differ-
ent kinds of information flow between system objects. These include: (i) from
a process to another process initiated by events like fork and clone, (ii) from a
process to a file/socket initiated by events like write and send, and (iii) from
a file/socket to a process initiated by events such as read, and receive. In the
last two columns of Table 2, we use arg(s) to indicate the argument(s) of system
calls to refer to the object(s) that the caller process manipulates. In particular,
depending on the system call, the argument type may be the id of a process, the
name of a file, or a descriptor referring to a file/socket.
3 Approach
Approach in a nutshell. The goal of ProPatrol is to compartmentalize
execution of long-running processes to smaller partitions by leveraging the high-
level tasks extracted from audit logs. More precisely, after traces of an attack are
detected, we want to perform forensic analysis and identify who initiated the con-
nection (untrusted source versus legitimate local user), how it happened (history
of the connection), and what system entities (processes, files, etc.) are affected.
To answer these questions, we systematically follow the dependency between
system entities (e.g., files, sockets, processes), which is constructed based on a
system-wide provenance monitoring. This provenance monitoring is transparent
to users, incurs negligible overhead, and does not require application instru-
mentation (details are discussed in 2.2). An overview of ProPatrol is shown
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Fig. 3. Approach Overview.
in Figure 3. The provenance monitoring module constructs a dependency graph
based on audit logs coming from enterprise hosts. Once an attack is detected, the
compartmentalization module partitions long-running processes to smaller parts
called Active Execution Units, where each Active Execution Unit relates inputs
to outputs that are truly dependent on those inputs. For instance, in the case of a
browser such as Google Chrome, each Active Execution Unit represents a single
user-supplied URL. Once the Active Execution Units are determined, ProPa-
trol detects the root cause of the attack by performing a backward traversal
from an attack point. In addition, it detects the affected objects by performing
a forward traversal from the root cause. Thus, system analysts can quickly pin-
point the attack source and the affected system entities, which minimizes manual
investigation efforts.
3.1 Attack Investigation
Solving the Dependency Explosion Challenge In prior approaches dealing with
dependency explosion, a process is partitioned into smaller units of execution
based on performing heavy code instrumentation or assuming that source code
is available and software developers annotate it [18, 20, 21]. They use each unit
to next correlate the provenance of received inputs to the produced outputs. On
the contrary, we propose an approach that takes advantage of application com-
partments to learn a model through the analysis of the sequence of system calls
it generates. Using this model, we define a partitioning scheme for applications,
which assigns the provenance to the output objects of each Active Execution
Unit.
In particular, we define an active execution unit as the segment of an ap-
plication that processes an input or a set of inputs as a result of user activity.
Examples of such activities include reading a new email, browsing on a new
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website, and so on. We note that for the attacks that we deal with in this paper
(e.g., drive-by download) we assume that such user activity is always present.
To use Active Execution Units to assign provenance, we need to be able to
identify them from the system call traces when an Active Execution Unit starts
and when it ends. Besides, for every system call that interacts with an object
(e.g., a file or a process) and that appears between that start and that end, we
associate the provenance related to the Active Execution Unit to that object. For
instance, the Active Execution Unit of a browser such as Chrome is the website
instance sending a request to Chrome’s kernel process, while for an email client,
the Active Execution Unit is the email that the user is currently reading.
3.2 Active Execution Unit Identification
Our methodology is based on an initial guided inference phase which exercises
different applications with a variety of inputs. The inference is guided by an
intuitive knowledge of what represents an active execution unit that might get
compromised. For instance, for Google Chrome, active execution units are rep-
resented by visited websites, while for Thunderbird by the single emails. Such
inference can be made with a high degree of certainty for several applications
whose design and architecture are public knowledge, either because they are
open source, or because of developer documentation.
When a new Active Execution Unit starts, some system events are generated
by the part of application that is responsible for handling a new Active Execution
Unit while others are commonly generated as a result of other application logic
unrelated to this. Based on our observations, the latter represents a significant
portion of the system calls and, during the inference phase, a source of ‘noise’
for correctly deriving the boundaries between Active-Execution-Units. Next, we
propose a method to extract a sequence of system calls responsible for handling
Active Execution Unit.
Using our previous definition, we can partition an application into several
Active Execution Units, only one of which is active at any given time. To assign
a system call to the correct Active Execution Unit, we must, however, be able to
identify which Active Execution Unit is active when the system call is generated.
In general, the problem can be defined as follows: Given a stream of system
calls arriving one at a time, and given a set of bins, each representing an Ac-
tive Execution Unit, which is the active bin (that is the current active Active
Execution Unit), to which a system call belongs?
We tackle this problem by creating an inference procedure, which exercises
different activities to switch among Active Execution Units and user actions that
cause new input to be received. More formally, for each application, we want to
derive the following rules during such inference phase:
– Rule 1: if(isObserved(Sk)⇒ Bink = newBin(); )
– Rule 2: if(isObserved(Si)⇒ {k = non_active; i = active; })
– Rule 3: if(isActive(i)))⇒ Bini = Bini ∪ sj
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Rule 1 deals with the creation of a new Active Execution Unit (e.g., a new
tab, or a new email which comes under the user’s focus). In this rule, Sk is
a commonly observed sequence of system calls and their arguments when a
new Active Execution Unit is created, and Bink represents a new empty bin.
This sequence is typically manifested during the initialization of a new Active
Execution Unit. Rule 2 deals with the switching tasks among different Active
Execution Units. In this rule, Si represents a commonly observed sequence of
system calls when the user switches among Active Execution Unit, k and i
represent the previous Active Execution Unit, which becomes inactive, and the
newly activated Active Execution Unit, respectively. Rule 3 deals with assigning
the current system call sj to the currently active bin.
These rules are based on the key intuition that activities such as the creation
of new Active Execution Unit or switching among existing ones are executions
of the same code in an application and they usually manifest in the same system
call sequences.
To derive the sequences Sk and Si for each application, we run that appli-
cation under different scenarios (e.g., open a tab, click on a link in an existing
tab or open the link in a new tab, or check an email or open an email in a
new window, etc.), with different actions and user inputs. For each creation or
switching, we record its start by introducing a special event (e.g., a mouse click)
and collect the traces of system calls and their arguments, together with addi-
tional information such as PIDs and TIDs (thread ids). Next, we compare the
sequences and extract the longest common subsequence among all the traces.
More formally, given a set of system call traces, collected for the same type
of activity repeated M times:
– S1 = (s11, s12, s1N )
– S2 = (s21, s22, s2N )
– ...
– SM = (sM1, sM2, sMN )
We find the longest subsequence SL = (sl1, sl2, slK) where each sli is present in
all the traces (S1, ..., SM ), and where for any two consecutive sli and sli+1 in
SL, sli+1 follows sli in each of the traces (S1, ..., SM ), possibly with other system
calls between them. This subsequence represents a system call signature related
to the specific activity, which is always present at the start of that activity. We
use such subsequence as the ‘boundary’ between the different active execution
units.
After such subsequences are learned for a number of different activities under
different inputs, we introduce them in the rules previously described. In particu-
lar, every time a new Active Execution Unit’s start is detected, we initiate a new
bin. While this Active Execution Unit is active, we assign the connections that
are created to receive input to that bin. When a switch to an existing Active
Execution Unit is detected, we save the state of the current Active Execution
Unit, in order to restore it once it becomes active again. If no subsequences can
be identified, we conclude that the application is not suitable to be compart-
mentalized by our approach.
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4 Implementation
4.1 Provenance Monitor
To trace the system calls, ProPatrolmakes use of Systemtap [2], a very efficient
Linux profiling tool designed to have near zero overhead. For each system call,
we collect the timestamps, caller process id, group process id, system call name,
and its arguments. We store these logs into a file to be analyzed further by the
attack investigation module. Whenever a fork or clone appears in the logs, the
new process or thread is monitored too.
4.2 Compartmentalization
4.2.1 Google Chrome
To isolate websites from each other, Google Chrome consists of multiple
renderer processes which communicate with Chrome’s kernel process. Google
Chrome supports different models of how to allocate websites to the renderer
processes [30]. However, by default, it creates a separate renderer process for
each web page instance which user visits. Each renderer process communicates
the jobs to the kernel process and receives responses via the recvmsg system call.
Chrome’s kernel process is responsible for networking and filesystem I/O tasks.
These jobs include DNS requests, content download, reading and writing to the
file system and so on. Consequently, ProPatrol associates the provenance of
an input with a renderer process which has sent a request to Chrome’s kernel
process.
Active Execution Unit Selection. An active execution unit includes a ren-
derer process and all the objects and processes initiated by the kernel in response
to that renderer’s messages. To be able to correctly assign and propagate the
provenance, the attack investigation module must, therefore, associate each sys-
tem call it receives with the correct active execution unit. We do this by taking
advantage of the recvmsg system calls. In particular, when a recvmsg between
the kernel and one of the renderer processes is found by the attack investigation
module, we associate that system call, and all the subsequent system calls of
the kernel and the renderer to the active execution unit related to that renderer.
These system calls may include forking of new processes (e.g., plugins), writing
to files, and so on. The new objects that are created or modified as a result
of these system calls are associated with the provenance of the renderer. When
a new recvmsg is ‘seen’ by the attack investigation module from a different
renderer process, we switch to the active execution unit corresponding to that
renderer.
4.2.2 Thunderbird
In the case of Thunderbird, each received email can be considered as a differ-
ent sandbox associated with some provenance information related to the sender.
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Thunderbird stores all emails in a single file called INBOX and when a user
opens a specific email, this file is accessed at an offset corresponding to that
email using the read system call.
Active Execution Unit Selection. An active execution unit in Thunderbird
is defined as a set of objects to which information flows from Thunderbird as a
result of reading an email. This set may include, files written by Thunderbird to
the file system, browser processes forked by Thunderbird as a result of clicking on
a link in an email and so on. In Thunderbird, each email is stored at a different
offset in a single file, and Thunderbird uses this offset to access emails when
prompted by the user. Therefore, when the attack investigation module finds
a read system call into the INBOX file at a particular offset, it associates all
the subsequent system calls with the active execution unit corresponding to the
email at that offset.
4.2.3 Pidgin Chat Application
Pidgin is a chat application. Each active execution unit in Pidgin corresponds
to a chat window and the objects to which information flows from that window.
Similar to Thunderbird, interaction with each chat window corresponds to access
to a file. However, Pidgin keeps separate files for each chat window.
Active Execution Unit Selection. Pidgin’s screen is separated into different
chat windows each of which corresponds to a different file on disk. Therefore,
an active execution unit is switched by the attack investigation module when it
finds a read system call to the file associated with a chat window.
5 Evaluation
5.1 Enterprise Setup
To evaluate the effectiveness of ProPatrol, we simulate a set of attacks on an
enterprise testbed of user workstations and Intranet servers. In particular, the
Intranet consists of three Ubuntu user workstations and three Intranet servers.
The Intranet servers include a GIT server used for collaborative coding within
the enterprise, a web-based router, and a web server interfaced with a database
that manages employees’ personal information.
5.2 Graphs
To facilitate forensic analysis, ProPatrol produces visual graph representations
to be used by analysts. In the Linux kernel, threads are implemented as processes
that have the same process group. In the graph representation, we cluster the
processes with the same process group (the process and its threads) together.
The graphs depict processes and threads as ovals, sockets, and files, as well as
information flow, labeled by numbers that show the sequence of events as they
happened over time. Note that all the graphs we present in this section use these
notations.
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5.3 Summary of Results
Table 4, summarizes ProPatrol’s compartmentalization capability on high-
lighting five different classes of attacks that target common applications such
as browsers and email clients. These attacks include Remote Administration
Tools (RAT) installation via an attachment on a spear-phishing email, drive-
by download that exploits a Java plugin vulnerability, social engineering via an
IM client, CSRF, and DNS rebinding. After the initial compromise in all these
attacks, attackers pivot to one of the intranet machines that contain confiden-
tial information. At that point, an attack is detected, and system analysts use
ProPatrol to find the root-cause of a connection to the corresponding sockets.
Application Attack Root-Cause Detection?
Email Client (Thunderbird) RAT X
Browser (Google-Chrome) Drive-by download X
IM Client (Pidgin) Social engineering X
Browser (Google-Chrome) CSRF X
Browser (Google-Chrome) DNS Rebinding X
Table 4. Overview of attack investigation results.
5.4 Root-Cause Analysis
Below we present details of the five scenarios on which we evaluated ProPatrol.
5.4.1 Remote Access Trojan (RAT)
Setup. A RAT is a malicious binary that can execute several commands sent
by the attacker. In this evaluation, we consider a spear-phishing email contain-
ing a RAT as an attachment. We assume that the user that receives this email
is tricked into saving and executing the attachment. The attachment performs
some malicious activity in the background without the user noticing it. In our
evaluation, after it is downloaded to the user workstation, the RAT binary per-
forms network scanning in the background. In this scenario, we used Nmap and
a shell script that starts Nmap to mimic a RAT, which after being executed
scans an internal IP address.
Attack Investigation. Using ProPatrol, we were able to find the root-
cause of this RAT starting from the connections sent to Intranet servers. The
sequence of system calls related to the active execution unit is processed by
ProPatrol to create a causal graph depicted in Figure 5. Using this graph,
a system administrator can easily infer the machine that has fallen victim to a
malicious RAT that scans the network in the background.
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thunderbird
~/Downloads/scan.sh
4. open 5. write
~/.thunderbird/ImapMail/imap.mail.domain.edu/INBOX
2. open
scan.sh
6. execve 8. read
3. read
sender@untrusted.com
1. write
nmap
localSocket: 410. socket
11. sendto
good.local: 80
link
7. open
9. clone
Fig. 5. Provenance graph for RAT detection scenario.
5.4.2 Drive-by Download
Setup. This attack exploits CVE-2012-4681, a vulnerability that allows a
Java applet to bypass SecurityManager restrictions in Oracle Java Runtime En-
vironment (JRE) version 7. We set up an external malicious web server that
hosts a Java applet exploiting this vulnerability. Whenever a victim browser
with the Java Plugin connects to the malicious web server, the attacker can exe-
cute arbitrary code on the victim’s machine. Specifically, we install JRE version
7 on the user workstations inside our network and set up the Java plugin for
the Google-Chrome browser. Then we conduct the attack on one of the user’s
machines. The attack proceeds as follows. The user opens Google-Chrome, and
among other benign activities, he opens a tab connecting to a malicious web
server. When the user workstation connects to the malicious web server, the
attacker notices this event. Then using Metasploit, the attacker opens a remote
shell on the user workstation. Next, as a lateral movement for accessing the In-
tranet servers, the attacker tries to steal the enterprise project’s data from the
Git Server. Using the remote shell, the attacker performs git pull to pull the
latest codebase of the project on the Git Server. Finally, the attacker sends the
codebase to the attacker’s server.
Attack Investigation. A provenance graph generated byProPatrol, start-
ing from a backward traversal from the git connection to the internal git server, is
visualized in Figure 6. The first edge is artificial, and we consider it to show that
the socket connection on port 80 of evil.org is on a malicious website. Chrome
is the initial process that is executed by the user opening Google-Chrome. Later,
that process clones two threads (Chrome_IOThread and Chrome_ProcesssL)
(edges labeled with 2 and 3). The Chrome_IOThread connects to the attacker’s
site and retrieves some data. The thread (Chrome_ProcessL) clones a set of dif-
ferent processes, threads, and applications for getting access to the remote shell
(see edges 7-19). These intermediate steps are considered as internal mechanisms
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of Metasploit and the Java exploit we are using. After accessing the remote shell
at edge 21, the attacker enters a git command. As the Git server uses SSH proto-
col, an SSH process is cloned and connects to port 22 on the Intranet Git server
good.local (edges 26-28).
For the attack that exfiltrates the code base of the Git server, using the
ProPatrol, we were able to identify the root-cause starting from the point
that the attacker performs lateral movements to internal servers.
ssh
localSocket: 3
26. socket27. connect28. write
good.local: 22
link
git
25. clone
git-pull
24. clone
git
23. clone
bash
22. clone
python
21. clone
sh
20. clone
yLFxIEqQ.exe
19. fork
yLFxIEqQ.exe
18. clone
java
17. vfork
java
16. clone
java
15. vfork
java
14. clone
java
13. vfork
java
12. clone
java
11. clone
java
10. clone
java
9. clone
chrome
8. vfork
Chrome_ProcessL 7. cloneChrome_IOThread
localSocket: 111
4. socket 5. connect 6. read
evil.org: 80
link
chrome
2. clone3. clone
Untrusted_Remote
1. write
Fig. 6. Provenance graph for drive-by-download attack detection.
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Chrome_IOThread
localSocket: 107
6. socket 7. connect 8. write9. write
localSocket: 169
3. socket 4. connect
good.local: 443
link
5. read
evil.org: 80
link
chrome
2. clone
Untrusted
Remote
1. write
Fig. 7. Provenance graph for web attack scenario involving CSRF and DNS rebinding.
5.4.3 CSRF and DNS Rebinding
In this class of attacks, we demonstrate how we investigate CSRF and DNS
Rebinding using ProPatrol. We combined these two because of the similarity
of the attack vectors.
Setup. Our setup involves two malicious external web servers, one for CSRF
and one for DNS Rebinding. The user workstation runs Google-Chrome with
multiple open tabs. Some of the open tabs are connected to Intranet servers’
sites. The user next uses one of the tabs to browse to one of the malicious
websites, causing the browser to retrieve a page. Finally, the retrieved page
sends a request to the Intranet server.
For CSRF attack, we tested many different scenarios. These include: (i) re-
trieving a page that contains a hyperlink to an Intranet server and a user clicks
on it to access the Intranet server, (ii) retrieving a page that contains an ele-
ment addressed by internal addresses and a JavaScript code snippet that checks
the availability of those elements for port-scanning the enterprise network, and
(iii) a JavaScript code snippet sending a malicious GET/POST request to the
webpage of the internal router having a CSRF vulnerability for changing the
password.
To evaluate ProPatrol against DNS Rebinding attacks, we set up a mali-
cious external site containing a web server and a DNS server implemented with
Dnsmasq. The DNS server has two IP addresses registered for the domain name
of the web server, i.e., the IP address of the web server and the IP address of
the Intranet server. When the user browser connects to this site and tries to
resolve the domain name, the first IP it receives is the IP address of the web
server. As a result, the browser connects to the web server and loads a webpage
containing a JavaScript code that keeps requesting resources from the Intranet
web server. These requests are blocked because Same-Origin-Policy prevents ac-
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cessing the contents hosted on other origins. After a while, the user’s browser
connects to the DNS server one more time and tries to resolve the domain name
again. This time, it is resolved to the Intranet web server’s IP address, and the
Same-Origin-Policy is circumvented —enabling the attacker’s script to read the
response from Intranet server and send it to the attacker’s machine.
Attack Investigation. As shown in Figure 7, ProPatrol has detected
the root-cause starting by a backward traversal from the attacker’s attempt
to send a malicious request to the Intranet server. The first edge is artificial,
and we consider it to show that the socket connection on port 80 of evil.org
is on an untrusted site. Chrome process is the initial process that is executed
by the user opening Google-Chrome. Later that process clones a thread named
Chrome_IOThread. This thread creates the local socket 169 and connects to
the attacker’s site. Then edge numbers 6 to 9 are events related to making a
connection to the port 443 of the Intranet server good.local. Event numbers 8
and 9 transfer some untrusted information to the socket on the intranet server.
Note that ProPatrol did not correlate the attack to the other valid requests
going to Intranet servers in other applications or other tabs of the browser.
5.4.4 Instant Messaging Client
Setup. To demonstrate how ProPatrol forensically investigates attacks
targeting Instant messaging clients, we considered the Pidgin IM client. Pidgin
maintains individual conversation history in separate files for each contact of
a user. We add a google account in the Pidgin that contains a list of added
buddies. Then we start chatting with some of them. For each buddy, there is a
chat communication that is stored in a separate file from the other conversations.
Attack Investigation. The provenance graph for detecting an attack that
happens via an IM client is shown in Figure 8. In the chat communication with
username2, username1 receives a chat messages with a link to a vulnerable In-
tranet server. When username1 clicks on the malicious link, a Google-Chrome
process is forked by pidgin, and a connection to the Intranet server is initiated.
At this moment, the active execution unit corresponds to the chat window with
username2. Therefore, ProPatrol detects username2 as the root-cause of this
attack.
5.5 Effectiveness
Table 9 shows the effectiveness of ProPatrol pertaining to event volume reduc-
tion. In this table, the second column shows the number of system calls generated
by each application for its initialization which is the duration from the start of
the application until it loads completely. Execution of each one of these applica-
tions could be compartmentalized to smaller bins depending on user activities.
For instance, a new bin is created when a user opens a new tab in Chrome,
or opens a new chat window in Pidgin, or reads a new email in Thunderbird.
The third column shows the number of events assigned to each bin on average.
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Application InitializationSyscalls
Average Bin
Syscalls
Average active
execution unit Syscalls
Google-Chrome 200K 14K < 50
Thunderbird 91.5K 8K < 20
Pidgin 20.5K 1K < 15
Table 9. Effectiveness of attack summaries.
For example, in the case of Google Chrome, if a user opens 10 tabs, the size of
provenance graph would be about 200K + 10 × 14K. In any attack, typically
only one bin is responsible for the attack, and ProPatrol successfully identifies
it. The fourth column shows the final number of events that ProPatrol shows
to the system analyst after detecting the root-cause. As evidenced by this table,
ProPatrol can achieve orders of magnitude reduction in event volume.
5.6 Performance Overhead
Table 10 shows the performance overhead introduced by ProPatrol and the
time required for generating the attack graphs. As shown in the second column
of Table 10, we calculate the average time for a single system call per scenario
in microseconds. The third column shows the overhead (in percentage) by the
monitoring infrastructure (which includes Systemtap and the provenance graph
building module), which on average is 1.1.%. We set up the graph generation
module on a 32 bit Ubuntu OS, Quad-Core 2.4 GHz Intel Xeon Processor with
10 GB RAM. The time (in seconds) this module took for highlighting the root-
cause of an attack is shown in the fourth column of Table 10 showing a very
minimal overhead. Overall, both the graph generation module and Systemtap
Chrome_IOThread localSocket: 83
7. socket
8. connect
9. write
good.local:80
link
chrome
6. clone
pidgin
5. clone
pidgin
4. clone
/root/.purple/logs/domain/username1/username2/date.time.html
2. open 3. read
sender@untrusted.com
1. write
Fig. 8. Provenance graph for an attack scenario that targets an IM client.
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Scenario
Avg Event
time (µs)
Provenance Monitor
Overhead (%)
Graph Generation
time (sec)
RAT 8.87 0.72 0.12
Drive-by download 16.37 1.57 0.001
Social engineering 9.87 0.16 0.0004
CSRF 8.10 1.14 0.03
DNS Rebinding 15.71 1.88 0.08
Table 10. Overhead for the Provenance Monitor and Graph Generation Time.
incur negligible overhead due to the coarse-grained provenance tracking under-
lying ProPatrol.
6 Related Work
6.1 System-wide Provenance Collection
SPADE [6] and PASS [25] are operating system level provenance systems. SPADE
hooks into the audit subsystem in the Linux kernel to observe program actions
whereas PASS intercepts system calls made by a program. Both of these systems
observe application events such as process creation and input/output, which is
then used to find out the relationship between data sets. LineageFS [28] modifies
the Linux kernel to log process creation and file-related system calls in printk
buffer. A user-level process reads this buffer periodically to generate lineage
records. Similar approaches to collect provenance are Hi-Fi [27] and LPM [3] —
these are kernel level systems that track the provenance of system objects. While
they provide a secure and application-transparent way of collecting provenance,
they do need provenance awareness at the application level in order to counter
the dependence explosion problem. Moreover, SLEUTH [9] and HOLMES [23]
use kernel audit logs for real-time attack detection and forensics, which could
benefit from the light-weight compartmentalization approaches such as ProPa-
trol to improve accuracy.
6.2 Information Flow Tracking
Some past work (such as [29,33]) proposed information flow tracking at processor-
level with manufacturer support. Some others (e.g., [14, 26] perform binary
rewriting at runtime to instrument machine code with additional instructions
that update shadow memory. Xu et al. [31] employ source code transformation
by instrumenting C code with additional code that can handle flow tracking.
Being fine-grained techniques, they offer good precision in tracking the source of
enterprise activity. However, all these approaches impose a high overhead. For
instance, [14] imposes a 3.65x slowdown factor. Another line of work also uses
techniques to decouple taint tracking from program execution [4, 11,17,24].
In the coarse-grained tracking front, Backtracker by King et al. [15] is one
of the first works in this area that introduced the notion of dependency graphs.
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The same authors extended Backtracker in [16] with support for multi-host de-
pendencies, forward tracking and correlating disconnected IDS alerts. To reduce
the size of audit logs, different methods [8, 10, 19, 32] are proposed leveraging
graph abstraction, garbage collection, or compactness techniques.
6.3 Execution Partitioning
Execution partitioning techniques are proposed for dividing the execution of
long-running programs into smaller units, resulting in a better forensic analy-
sis. BEEP is a closely related approach to ProPatrol. BEEP is based on the
notion of independent units whereby a long-running program is partitioned into
individual units by monitoring the execution of the program’s event-handling
loops, with each iteration corresponding to the processing of an independent
input/request. An essentially backward forensic tracing system, BEEP, is suit-
able for programs that tend to have independent loop iterations. Ma et al. [21]
introduced ProTracer, a lightweight provenance tracing system that only cap-
tures system calls related to taint propagation. ProTracer records the history
of objects by logging important events. It utilizes an instrumentation technique
called BEEP [18] for partitioning an execution into smaller units. BEEP [18] and
ProTracer [21] use training and code instrumentation to divide execution to mul-
tiple iterations of the main loop in a program. Another related work, MPI [20]
relies on users to annotate the application’s high-level task structures to enable
semantic-aware execution partitioning.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we presented ProPatrol, as a compartmentalization approach
for doing more accurate and timely root-cause analysis. ProPatrol uses a
lightweight provenance monitoring system to effectively perform forward/back-
ward tracking. Our evaluation shows that the tracking system operates with a
very minimal overhead of less than 2%. We demonstrated in an enterprise setting
that ProPatrol is able to detect the root-cause of a broad class of APT vectors
such as spear phishing, drive-by downloads, RATs, CSRF, and DNS Rebinding
attacks.
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